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CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGES AND WORK-
PRODUCT PROTECTIONS SHOULD ABSOLUTELY BE PRESERVED
Jennifer M. Gardner*
INTRODUCTION
In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent.1
Looking back at the reason of the privilege, it is seen to secure the client’s freedom
of mind in committing his affairs to the attorney’s knowledge. It is designed to
influence him when he may be hesitating between the positive action of disclosure
and the inaction of secrecy.2
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest and most basic tenets of
American common law.  Over the years, however, this privilege has eroded3
away as it applies to corporations. Beginning in 1999 with the promulgation
of a memorandum issued by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder
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http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm, reprinted in 72 CRIM L. REP. (BNA) 481 (2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo].
6. Memorandum from Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. Robert D. McCallum, Jr. to Heads of Dep’t
Components and United States Attorneys, Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product
Protection (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/
AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf [hereinafter McCallum Memo].
7. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep’t Components and
United States Attorneys, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2008) [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
8. See, e.g., Holder Memo, supra note 4, § VI.A; McNulty Memo, supra note 7, § VII.B.2.
9. McNulty Memo, supra note 7, § III.A.4, § VII.B.2.
10. See, e.g., Statement of Dick Thornburgh, Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham
LLP and Former Att’y Gen. of the United States, Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Pub. Meeting
Regarding Chapter Eight Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege & Work Product Protections (Nov. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/11_15_05/Thornburgh.pdf.
(the Holder Memo),  the Department of Justice has consistently pursued a4
policy of “compelled waiver” with regard to corporations. This Department
policy has been repeatedly reaffirmed over the years in subsequent
memoranda from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson (the
Thompson Memo),  Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum,5
Jr. (the McCallum Memo),  and Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty6
(the McNulty Memo).7
According to the Department of Justice policy, a corporation should be
willing to waive its attorney-client privilege and its work-product protection
in order to show that it is cooperating with an investigation.  A prosecutor is8
specifically instructed to consider the corporation’s willingness to waive these
privileges and protections when that prosecutor is deciding whether or not to
charge the corporation.  This process has come to be known as “compelled9
waiver” because a corporation is “compelled” to accede to a waiver request
in order to show the cooperation necessary to avoid indictment. Compelled
waiver has become a very real concern to corporations and to the legal
profession because it significantly reduces the protections previously afforded
by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product protection.10
Not only does compelled waiver infringe upon a corporation’s attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection in the primary investigation, but
it also causes a corporation to forfeit the privilege and protection as to all
other adversaries, including civil litigants. Once the corporation has agreed to
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waive its privilege or its protection, it cannot reclaim either against future
adversaries. In 1977, the Eighth Circuit introduced a concept of limited, or
selective, waiver that attempted to ameliorate this concern.  The selective11
waiver doctrine allowed a corporation to continue to claim attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection for documents that it revealed to the
government in the course of a criminal investigation. However, as I shall
discuss in this Note, this doctrine has been systematically rejected by all other
circuits considering the issue. Furthermore, in most circuits, the privilege is
considered waived in its entirety even if waived in response to governmental
compulsion.12
In January 2007, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act (the ACPPA) in the Senate in an attempt to safeguard
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.  If passed, the13
ACPPA will make it illegal for United States Attorneys to condition any
charging decision upon waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection.  This Act would seem to restore the attorney-client14
privilege and the work-product protection to their previous statuses in the
corporate context. However, the ACPPA does not contain any remedy
provisions and so it remains unclear what consequences will accrue in the
event that the Act is violated. Corporations must still be on guard and actively
protect their privileges because it is possible that the ACPPA will offer little
protection once waiver has been obtained by a U.S. Attorney.
In Part I of this Note, I will discuss the history and policy of the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product protection. Part II will explore the
history of the Department of Justice policy of compelling corporations to
waive their privileges and protections. Part III will discuss the evolution of
selective waiver and its limited ability to correct the harms caused by
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compelled waivers. Part IV will evaluate the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act and its ability to protect a corporation from issues of compelled
waiver. Part V discusses the possible remedies for violations of the ACPPA.
This Note concludes that without stated remedies, it is unlikely that the
ACPPA will provide a corporation with significant protection from compelled
waiver and advises corporations to continue to take an active approach to
guarding their attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.
I. THE HISTORY AND POLICY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law.”  The primary15
function of the privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”  The law16
recognizes this privilege because of the important role that a fully informed
lawyer plays in guiding a corporate client in its compliance efforts.17
Narrowing the scope of this privilege “not only makes it difficult for corporate
attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific
legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate
counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law.”  In the absence of18
the privilege, “the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it
would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.”19
Privileges keep relevant evidence from the factfinder.  Therefore, the20
attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed and only applies to “those
disclosures [ ] necessary to obtain informed legal advice [ ] which might not
have been made absent the privilege.”  For example, a pre-existing and21
discoverable document will not become privileged when the client shares it
with an attorney because the privilege is not necessary to encourage the client
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to share the document.  However, a statement made to an attorney in search22
of legal advice is privileged because denial of the privilege would make the
client less likely to make the statement.  This privilege has been held to apply23
to corporations as well as individuals.24
B. The Work-Product Protection
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of
a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way
in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote
justice and to protect their clients’ interests. This work is reflected, of course, in
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions,
personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though
roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the “work product of
the lawyer.” Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served.25
The concept of protecting an attorney’s work-product was developed
more recently.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) only allows an26
adverse party to obtain an attorney’s work-product “upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Even upon
such a showing, the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of the party concerning the
litigation” are protected from disclosure.  The purposes for this protection are27
twofold: (1) without this protection, “much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten” leading to inefficiency and reduced service
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for the client, and (2) the legal profession would be harmed as “unfairness and
sharp practices” would develop and attorneys would become
“demoraliz[ed].”  Like recognition of attorney-client privilege, recognition28
of work-product protection best serves “the interests of the clients and the
cause of justice.”29
II. COMPELLED WAIVER AND MEASURING CORPORATE COOPERATION
A. The Holder and Thompson Memos: Requiring Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege and the Work-Product Protection in Exchange for
Cooperation Credit
In June 1999, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. issued a memo to
all United States Attorneys, commonly referred to as the “Holder Memo.”30
The purpose of this memo was to establish guidelines to assist prosecutors in
deciding when to charge a corporation. The memo set out eight factors for a
prosecutor to consider “in reaching a decision as to the proper treatment of a
corporate target.”  These factors guide a prosecutor “[i]n conducting an31
investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating plea
agreements.”  The purpose of these factors is to “ensure that the general32
purposes of the criminal law—assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence
of further criminal conduct, protection of the public from dangerous and
fraudulent conduct, rehabilitation of offenders, and restitution for victims and
affected communities—are adequately met.”33
One of the eight factors that the Holder Memo instructs prosecutors to
consider is “[t]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including,
if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product
privileges.”  The memo highlights the significant benefits that can accrue to34
the government when a target has been convinced to waive these protections:
“Such waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible
witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual
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40. See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Essay: Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006) (discussing the dramatic consequences
of the criminal indictment of Arthur Andersen). See also White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client
Privilege and Corporate Waivers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17 (2006) (statement of Thomas J. Donohue,
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cooperation or immunity agreements. In addition, they are often critical in
enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation’s
voluntary disclosure and cooperation.”35
In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson released
a revised version of the Holder Memo, commonly referred to as the
“Thompson Memo.”  The purpose of the revised memo was to “increase[ ]36
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”37
This memo identified nine factors for evaluating a corporation’s level of
cooperation, but still included a corporation’s waiver of its attorney-client
privilege and work-product protections as a factor in making charging
decisions.  Footnotes in both memos suggested that waivers should only be38
requested with respect to extraneous matters and should not be sought “with
respect to communications and work product related to advice concerning the
government’s criminal investigation.”39
These documents transformed the concept of waiver into something that
was required, rather than something that was beneficial. The now-infamous
Arthur Andersen incident provides a vivid example of the danger of not
cooperating with the government.  When an indictment has the potential40
effect of annihilating a corporation, there is a considerable amount of pressure
to do whatever the government asks in order to avoid indictment. If the
government considers waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection as one of only a few factors in deciding whether or not to indict a
corporation, the pressure on the corporation to comply is significant.
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B. The McCallum Memo: Emphasizing the Government’s Need for Waiver
and Encouraging an Official Request Process
In October 2005, Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum,
Jr. released a memo that further entrenched the Department’s policy of
compelling waiver.  Commonly referred to as the “McCallum Memo,” this41
document re-emphasized the importance of the Thompson Memo and
instructed each U.S. Attorney’s Office to establish written policies related to
waiver requests.  It authorized U.S. Attorneys to use their discretion “to seek42
timely, complete, and accurate information from business organizations.”43
In March 2006, Mr. McCallum spoke to the Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security concerning the
waiver requests.  In that speech, McCallum emphasized the American44
political war on corporate fraud.  He highlighted the successes of the U.S.45
Attorneys in convicting corporate fraud offenders, and said that “[m]uch of
our success depends on our ability to secure cooperation.”  This cooperation,46
he noted, includes securing waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection.  Although McCallum claimed to have an utmost level of47
respect for the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, he declared that these
privileges run counter to the Department’s ability “to prosecute in a timely and
efficient manner.”  He stated that he believed the Thompson Memo creates48
an appropriate balance between “the legitimate interests furthered by the
privilege” and the need for “rigorous enforcement of the laws supporting
ethical standards of conduct.”49
McCallum gave four reasons detailing why the requested waiver policy
did not violate privilege concerns. First, waiver is only one part of
cooperation, and cooperation is not the only factor considered when deciding
whether to charge a corporation.  Second, waiver is only sought when there50
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is “a need for timely, complete, and accurate information” and then only with
supervisory approval.  Third, waiver requests will not deter corporations from51
conducting internal investigations because “responsible management” has a
duty to the shareholders to continue to conduct “timely internal
investigation[s].”  Finally, the harm of these waivers would be reduced by the52
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c)’s creation of “selective waiver.”53
C. The Public Response and the Alleged Harm to Corporations and the
Corporate Legal Community
Despite McCallum’s assurances that waivers are not routinely sought,
there is evidence that runs counter to that assertion. In November 2005, Dick
Thornburgh, counsel at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP  and54
former U.S. Attorney General, testified before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.  He testified that the white-collar criminal defense attorneys at55
his firm “now encounter waiver requests in virtually every organizational
criminal case in which they are involved” and that “waiver has become a
standard expectation of federal prosecutors.”  Governor Thornburgh told the56
committee that the McCallum Memo “strikes a rather defiant tone that can
only embolden prosecutors.”  His suggestion to the committee was that57
protection of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product should
be restored because these protections are “a fair limitation on prosecutors,
who have extraordinary powers to gather information for themselves.”58
In March 2006, Kent Wicker, law professor at the University of
Louisville and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, testified to the Sentencing
Commission on behalf of the National Association of Criminal and Defense
Lawyers.  He told the story of representing an officer of a company that felt59
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compelled to waive the privilege “because they were afraid they wouldn’t be
able to avoid indictment or to obtain reduction for acceptance of responsibility
or lack of culpability if they refused to waive the privilege.”  This situation60
adversely impacted the defense of the individual and prevented the company
from entering into a joint defense agreement with the officer.  In another61
incident, a corporation was compelled to demonstrate its cooperation by
waiving its privilege and then compelling an employee “to submit to an
interview by company counsel on pain of discharge if he refused.”  Forcing62
the corporation to turn over the compelled testimony of the employee only
exacerbated the harm of the compelled waiver.
Wicker testified that “the overwhelming [] majorit[y] of respondents to
the survey  and the overwhelming experience of people that I’ve talked to tell63
us that they’ve experienced these kinds of compelled waivers in their cases,
and they’re becoming more and more common.”  He further testified that “the64
effects of the erosion of the privilege work on the adversary system and are as
serious as the effect on individuals.”  The encroachment upon the privilege65
harms not only the parties involved, but also the candor of the attorney-client
relationship that was deemed important enough to justify the privilege in the
first place.66
At the same Sentencing Commission hearing in March 2006, Susan
Hackett, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for the Association of
Corporate Counsel, testified on behalf of the Coalition to Preserve the
Attorney-Client Privilege.  She presented the results of a survey on privilege67
erosion issues, which was conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel
in 2005.  According to Ms. Hackett:68
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[C]ompanies faced with a potential investigation, prosecution or enforcement action,
1) are increasing in number to the point that waiver requests or expectations are
considered routine; 2) have no meaningful ability to resist waiver expectations or
demands however they are presented; 3) will face severe consequences if they do
insist on exercising their privilege rights; and 4) suffered a significant and
discernable chill in their lawyer/client relationships negatively impacting the
lawyer’s ability to work with clients to adopt, implement, monitor, and report on
compliance initiatives that are poor to the company’s legal health.69
Ms. Hackett also presented the results of a follow-up survey. Those responses
painted a picture of “outrage” and “disbelief regarding government practices
vis-à-vis the privilege.”  Respondents frequently used the terms70
“prosecutorial abuses” and “coercion.”  She highlighted some of the results71
of that survey:72
. . . Almost 75[%] of both inside and outside counsel expressed agreement with
40[%] agreeing strongly with a statement that, [ ]“A culture of waiver has evolved
in which government agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to
expect a company under investigation to broadly waive attorney/client privilege or
work product protections,”. . . .
. . . Of the respondents who confirmed that they or their clients had been subject to
an investigation in the last five years, approximately 30[%] of in-house respondents
and 51[%] of outside counsel respondents said that the government expected a
waiver as a condition to engaging in bargaining, or to be eligible to receive more
favorable or lenient treatment.
Waiver is a condition of cooperation. Fifty-two percent of in-house respondents and
59[%] of outside counsel respondents confirmed that they believed that there has
been a marked increase in waiver requests as a condition of cooperation. And
consistent with that finding, roughly half of all investigations for any other inquiry
experienced by survey respondents resulted in a privilege waiver.
Further, and to refute the point often made that corporations are asked to waive but
they volunteer to waive on their own, prosecutors typically request privilege waiver.
It is rarely inferred by counsel. Of those who had been investigated, 55[%] of outside
counsel responded that waiver of the attorney/client privilege was requested by
enforcement officials either directly or indirectly.
. . . .
The sentencing guidelines are listed by respondents as among the top three reasons
given for waiver demands. This Commission specifically asked us to find out if it
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was reasonable to assume that the Sentencing Guidelines language was in some part
responsible for privilege waivers problems, rather, if it was somewhat of a hook upon
which waiver requests are hung, or if our concerns should be better addressed to
others who engage in privilege waivers discussions on a direct basis.
But the facts are in. Outside counsel indicated that the DOJ’s internal policies such
as the Thompson, Holder, [and] McCallum Memorandum are cited most frequently
when a reason for waiver is provided by a prosecutor or enforcement official. But the
Sentencing Guidelines are cited second. In-house counsel placed the guidelines third
behind the statement: A need for a quick and efficient resolution of the matter was
proposed in the DOJ policies, respectively[.]73
That same day in March 2006, Mr. McCallum appeared before the
Sentencing Commission to discuss removing privilege waiver as a
consideration under the Sentencing Guidelines.  At this hearing,74
Mr. McCallum testified that he knew of no “single complaint regarding
prosecutorial misconduct and improperly demanding a waiver.”  According75
to Mr. McCallum, the government wanted waiver to continue to be considered
as part of the Sentencing Guidelines on the grounds that not considering
waiver “would be counterproductive to legitimate important law enforcement
efforts.”  Mr. McCallum’s argument was based on the assumption that the76
government’s need for information trumped the need for the privilege. He
asserted that affecting a corporation’s sentence based on its willingness to
waive the privilege was key to “provok[ing] greater compliance, greater self-
examination and cooperation with law enforcement.”  He justified the77
government’s approach based on the nature of a corporation and the
sophistication of its attorneys. Mr. McCallum generalized that “corporations
are represented by sophisticated corporate counsel, perfectly capable of
evaluating the benefits of the disclosure to their client” and “not at all shy
about complaining to the Department and to United States Attorneys about
what they perceive to be overreaching tactics by Assistant United States
Attorneys.”  Finally, he asserted that compelled waiver does not chill the78
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81. McNulty Memo, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 9.
attorney-client relationship, that it does not reduce internal investigation, that
its effect on employees is irrelevant, and that any collateral civil harm will
dissipate if Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c) is adopted.79
D. The McNulty Memo: Softening the Government’s Approach
In December 2006, the Department of Justice released an update to the
Thompson Memo in response to public criticism and demands by Senator
Arlen Specter.  This memo, issued by Deputy Attorney General Paul J.80
McNulty, replaced the Thompson Memo and the McCallum Memo.81
Mr. McNulty acknowledged the prevailing concern that the practices of the
Department were “discouraging full and candid communications between
corporate employees and legal counsel.”  He cautioned against requesting82
waivers without good reason and established a new policy requiring “written
authorization” for any such request.  Despite acknowledging the importance83
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, however, the
memo still approves of waiver requests “when there is a legitimate need for
the privileged information.”  This need can exist whenever the likely benefit84
of obtaining the information outweighs factors such as the ease of obtaining
the information without the waiver, the “completeness of the voluntary
disclosure already provided,” and “the collateral consequences to a
corporation of a waiver.”85
The McNulty Memo attempts to reduce the harshness of compelled
waiver by distinguishing between requests for “purely factual information . . .
relating to the underlying misconduct (‘Category I’),” and requests for
“attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work product
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(‘Category II’).”  Category I information may or may not actually be86
privileged or protected.  Category II information is clearly protected by the87
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. It includes direct
communications between a corporation and its attorney “before, during, and
after the underlying misconduct occurred,” as well as any attorney work-
product “containing counsel’s mental impressions and conclusions, legal
determinations reached as a result of internal investigation, or legal advice
given to the corporation.”  Category II information is intended to be requested88
only “in rare circumstances.”  If a corporation does not waive its privilege as89
to Category II information, the prosecutor is instructed not to consider this in
making a charging decision, but in an arguably semantic twist, “[p]rosecutors
may always favorably consider a corporation’s acquiescence to the
government’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation has
cooperated in the government’s investigation.”90
The response to the McNulty Memo was unfavorable. Few commentators
seemed to feel that it was enough. American Bar Association President Karen
J. Mathis claimed that the changes fell “far short” of protecting attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection.  “Instead of eliminating the improper91
Department practice of requiring companies to waive their privileges in return
for cooperation credit . . . the new policy . . . merely requires high level
Department approval before waiver requests can be made.”  In a statement to92
the House Judiciary Committee, the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client
Privilege said, “[s]o long as the possibility of waiver demands exists, the
Justice Department’s policy will continue to hamper and chill corporate
compliance programs and investigations.”93
In March 2007, Richard White, 2007 Chairman of the Board of the
Association of Corporate Counsel, testified before the House Judiciary
Committee that “the McNulty Memorandum offers only some surface,
procedural changes and does nothing to address our larger concerns or abusive
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prosecutorial practices.”  He told the committee that his “corporate94
colleagues know from experience that many federal enforcement officials rely
almost exclusively on informal demands to coerce corporations to waive their
attorney client and work product protections,” and that “[n]o formal demand
is necessary given the culture of waiver the DOJ and other agencies have
fostered in the past few years.”  Finally, he pointed out that “establishing a95
clearer policy” for requesting waiver assumes that prosecutors “have a right
to determine when a corporate client’s privilege rights deserve protection and
when they don’t.”  But “the privilege is that of the client alone”  and does96 97
not belong to “the prosecutor who believes it might be convenient if it were
waived.”  In a public statement by the Association of Corporate Counsel, the98
ACC said that “[t]he McNulty Memo does more to protect unabated waiver
demands made by prosecutors, but still misses the fundamental point: that
prosecutors don’t get to decide when they think waiver is necessary.”99
This authorization requirement is little comfort to those who believe that
the government should never request a waiver. Stanton Anderson, Senior
Counsel to the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, issued
a statement saying, “As long as the [Deputy Attorney General’s Office] can
decide whether or not to demand waiver, the privilege is uncertain. An
uncertain privilege is no privilege at all.”  Sutherland Asbill & Brennan100
pointed out that it does not solve the selective waiver issue and it “leaves
enormous room for interpretation by the Department of Justice.”  Frederick101
J. Krebs, president of the Association of Corporate Counsel, opined that “this
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memo is a day late and a dollar short.”  He claimed that the changes “will102
not put an end to the ‘culture of waiver’ that exists within the DOJ.”  Senator103
Patrick Leahy expressed his concern that “depending on how the new policies
are implemented, prosecutors may still be able to inappropriately consider a
corporation’s waiver of this important privilege.”  Stephanie Martz, director104
of the White Collar Crime Project at the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, strongly disagreed with the McNulty Memo’s decision to
give corporations credit for waiving their privileges.  She claimed that105
“we’re at the point where waiver requests are routine, and the only way we
can try to put that genie back in the bottle is by not allowing corporations to
get credit for granting it.”106
III. SELECTIVE WAIVER
A. Introduction of the Doctrine of Selective Waiver
One very significant problem with compelled waiver is that it eliminates
the privilege entirely for all information disclosed, thus exposing the
corporation’s confidential information to any potential adversary.
Confidentiality is a key element of the attorney-client privilege, and once the
confidentiality of the information is compromised, the attorney-client privilege
no longer applies.  The work-product protection is likewise waived by107
disclosure of otherwise protected documents.  Therefore, once the108
corporation discloses the information to the government, it is no longer able
to claim either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection for
that information. Upon disclosure to the government, the information becomes
discoverable by any party, including civil litigants.
In 1977, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to ameliorate
these harsh effects of cooperating with the government by introducing the
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116. Id. at 599-601.
117. Id. at 611.
118. Id.
concept of “limited waiver” in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.  This109
concept has since come to be known as the doctrine of selective waiver.  In110
Diversified, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was investigating
Diversified Industries based on reports that it may have bribed its customers’
purchasing agents and been involved in other illegal activities.  After the111
SEC initiated its investigation, Diversified’s board of directors hired a law
firm to conduct an internal investigation and assess the suspicious activity.112
At that point, there was no pending litigation and the law firm was not hired
to represent Diversified in any future litigation.  The law firm produced a113
memorandum in June 1975 that outlined “historical matters” and the proposed
investigation.  One month later, one of Diversified’s customers,114
Weatherhead, brought a civil suit against Diversified alleging that Diversified
bribed Weatherhead employees to purchase significant amounts of inferior
copper from Diversified.  During discovery, Weatherhead requested copies115
of the law firm’s report, minutes of the meeting where the findings were
discussed, and a copy of the letter that Diversified’s president had issued to
various officers and managers of the corporation sharing the results of the
investigation.116
The Diversified court held that the law firm’s report, the relevant
corporate minutes, and the letter from Diversified’s president were all entitled
to protection; the issue was “whether Diversified waived its attorney-client
privilege with respect to the privileged material by voluntarily surrendering
it to the SEC pursuant to an agency subpoena.”  In a remarkably sparse117
portion of the opinion, the court held that “only a limited waiver of the
privilege occurred.”  The rationale for this holding was that “[t]o hold118
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise
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them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders, and
customers.”119
B. The Systematic Rejection of Selective Waiver
Diversified appeared to create a doctrine that would protect corporations
who cooperated with the government.  Under Diversified, a corporation120
could waive its attorney-client privilege or work-product protections vis-à-vis
the government in order to cooperate with a government investigation, while
still being able to invoke those protections against other parties in future civil
cases. This doctrine encouraged corporations to cooperate with government
investigations. In the wake of Diversified, however, the doctrine of selective
waiver was systematically rejected by every other circuit considering the
issue.121
In 1981, the D.C. Circuit rejected selective waiver in Permian Corp. v.
United States.  The Permian court rejected the doctrine for three reasons.122
First, the court found no connection between the concept of limited waiver
and the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.  Although the123
court could see a benefit in encouraging voluntary cooperation with
government investigations, it did not see how encouraging cooperation with
the government would improve the attorney-client relationship.  With or124
without selective waiver, a client is free to maintain his right to attorney-client
confidentiality “by consistently asserting the privilege, even when the
discovery request comes from a ‘friendly’ agency.”  Therefore, selective125
waiver was not justified by the purposes underlying the attorney-client
privilege.
Second, the court believed that it was unfair to allow a defendant to “pick
and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and
resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others . . . .”  If the126
corporation is willing to waive its privilege in order to obtain a benefit, it
cannot later resurrect that privilege as a weapon to prevent other litigants from
2008] CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGES 173
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1222.
130. Id. at 1221.
131. Id. at 1221-22.
132. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
133. Id. at 622-23.
134. 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991).
135. Id. at 1423.
136. Id. at 1424.
137. Id.
obtaining the information.  The privilege is to be narrowly construed because127
it “inhibits the truth-finding process,” and so the courts should not allow it to
be used as “a tool for selective disclosure.”  The court held that “the128
attorney-client privilege should be available only at the traditional price: a
litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine
confidentiality.”129
Third, the court was unable to find a persuasive public policy reason to
recognize the doctrine because it could be both a benefit and a detriment to
government agencies.  “It is apparent that such a doctrine would enable130
litigants to pick and choose among regulatory agencies in disclosing and
withholding communications of tarnished confidentiality for their own
purposes.”  Therefore, any public policy reason to encourage disclosure to131
one government agency would be obliterated by the doctrine’s negative effect
on other agencies.
The Fourth Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit in 1988 by rejecting
selective waiver in In re Martin Marietta Corp.  In a very matter-of-fact132
opinion, the Martin Marietta court held that, with a possible exception for
opinion work-product, once a corporation has revealed the documents to the
government, it has waived its privilege because it no longer has the required
expectation of confidentiality.133
Three years later, the Third Circuit rejected selective waiver in
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines.  The134
Westinghouse court gave several reasons for its rejection of the doctrine. One,
it emphasized the well-settled belief that a privilege should be narrowly
construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding process.”  Two, it could135
find no reason to recognize such protection where a party was willing to waive
the protection vis-à-vis a third party.  The court reasoned that if a party was136
willing to divulge the protected information to a third party, it was unlikely
that the party would keep that information from its attorney.  Three, the137
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court found Diversified’s rationale—that without selective waiver
corporations would hesitate to seek legal advice—to be less than
compelling.  Like the Permian court, the Third Circuit held that selective138
waiver did nothing to encourage a corporation to seek “informed legal
assistance” and thus was not justified by the principles underlying the
privilege.  Instead, “it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government139
agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose.”140
Finally, the court could not find any reason to create a new privilege. While
there was certainly reason to encourage “voluntary cooperation with
government investigations,” there was “little reason to believe . . . that this
interest outweighs ‘the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a right
to every man’s evidence.’’”  Furthermore, the court was not convinced that141
selective waiver was necessary to encourage corporations to cooperate with
government investigations, particularly where the party at issue,
Westinghouse, had itself disclosed the privileged materials to the SEC without
the protection of a selective waiver rule.142
In 1993, the Second Circuit refused to adopt the selective waiver doctrine
in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.  The Steinhardt court was also persuaded143
by Permian’s reasoning that selective waiver allowed a litigant to unfairly
pick and choose among its opponents. The court held that “selective assertion
of privilege should not be merely another brush on an attorney’s palette,
utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage.”  Neither is144
it fair to allow a party “‘to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit.’”  It also145
adopted the Permian court’s reasoning that selective waiver has no effect on
the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is to foster
“frank communication between attorney and client.”  Finally, the Steinhardt146
court found no reason to recognize a selective waiver protection because the
government had continued to receive voluntary cooperation from corporations
in spite of the consistent rejection of the selective waiver doctrine in the
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sixteen years since Diversified.  A corporation had other reasons to147
cooperate with the government, such as the avoidance of “formal investigation
and enforcement litigation,” the hope of possible leniency, and the obtainment
of “an opportunity to narrow the issues in any resulting litigation,” that made
selective waiver unnecessary.148
The Federal Circuit rejected selective waiver in 1997 in Genentech, Inc.
v. United States International Trade Commission.  The court held that149
“Genentech has presented no compelling arguments as to why we should
apply such a limited waiver theory in this case.”  The case was distinguished150
from similar cases in other circuits because the disclosure at issue was
inadvertent and “the result of inadequate screening procedures.”  As such,151
there was no reason to recognize a selective waiver where the disclosures were
not compelled.152
In 1997, the First Circuit rejected the doctrine in United States v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Consistent with previous courts that153
had rejected selective waiver, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology court
rationalized that the privilege “hinders the courts in the search for truth,” and
thus should be narrowly defined, and unfairly allows a party “to disclose
materials to one outsider while withholding them from another.”  The court154
was not convinced by the government’s interest in encouraging voluntary
disclosure because the government had other means to secure the necessary
information and had the ability to seek legislation from Congress if it needed
more assistance.  The court was equally unconvinced that refusing to adopt155
selective waiver would prevent corporations from obtaining adequate legal
advice.  Furthermore, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology court156
believed that the lack of selective waiver “makes the law more predictable and
certainly eases its administration,” where “[f]ollowing the Eighth Circuit’s
approach would require, at the very least, a new set of difficult line-drawing
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exercises that would consume time and increase uncertainty.”  The court was157
unwilling to make exceptions for disclosures to the government, particularly
those made purposefully in order to obtain a benefit or to avoid a
disadvantage, because it feared it would be going down a path “which has no
logical terminus.”158
The Sixth Circuit became the seventh circuit court to reject selective
waiver in 2002 with In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation.  Following the majority viewpoint, the Sixth Circuit rejected the159
doctrine for the same reasons as the other circuit courts. More specifically, the
court held that the doctrine of selective waiver was unrelated to the underlying
purposes of the attorney-client privilege,  that the doctrine unfairly allowed160
a party to pick and choose among its opponents, “waiving the privilege for
some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality as to others,”  and that the161
recognition of selective waiver would have “‘no logical terminus.’”  The162
court was also reluctant to give the government a tool that inhibited the truth
finding process when the government had the means to secure the necessary
information in other ways.  Finally, the court held that when a corporation163
makes the tactical decision to waive its attorney-client privilege in exchange
for more favorable treatment by the government, it should not be free from the
price of that decision.  As to work-product protection waiver, the court held164
that the same reasons applied as in the attorney-client privilege analysis: “[t]he
ability to prepare one’s case in confidence, which is the chief reason
articulated in Hickman, supra, for the work product protections, has little to
do with talking to the Government.”  In other words, encouraging165
cooperation with the government was completely unrelated to the purposes of
the work-product protection doctrine, and the court had no interest in
endorsing such a significant expansion of the doctrine.
Most recently, in 2006, the Tenth Circuit rejected the selective waiver
doctrine in In re Qwest Communications International Inc., Securities
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Litigation.  The Qwest court held that selective waiver was not needed “to166
assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, or to avoid unfairness to
the disclosing party.”  Like the Westinghouse court, the court held that167
Qwest’s cooperation in spite of the non-existence of the selective waiver
doctrine showed that the doctrine was not necessary to encourage
cooperation.  The court was also persuaded by the fact that the Department168
of Justice did not support Qwest’s assertion that the doctrine would benefit the
government.  As to promoting the purposes of the attorney-client privilege169
and work-product doctrine, namely encouraging attorney-client
communication, the court suggested that “selective waiver could have the
opposite effect of inhibiting such communication.”  Since these protections170
would be easier to waive, the client would be less likely to depend on the
attorney-client privilege and the attorney would be less likely to depend on the
work-product protection.  Finally, the court was unconvinced that Qwest171
would suffer any unfairness from the rejection of the doctrine where “Qwest
disclosed the [documents] in the face of the known threat from Plaintiffs, the
absence of Tenth Circuit precedent, and a dearth of favorable circuit
authority.”  Instead, Qwest determined that the disclosures were beneficial172
in spite of the risk of waiver.173
In May 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules proposed a new
Federal Rule of Evidence that would codify selective waiver,  but this too174
has been rejected. The original proposal for Federal Rule of Evidence 502
included a provision that would have allowed selective waiver for disclosures
of privileged or protected information “when made to a federal public office
or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority.”  When this proposed rule was finalized and introduced to175
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Congress in December 2007, however, the provision for selective waiver was
notably absent.176
C. The Selective Waiver Doctrine: Unlikely to Be Revived
Given the reasons discussed by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits, which seem to find selective waiver as
illogical and unnecessary, it comes as no surprise that selective waiver was
omitted from the final proposal for Rule 502. First, there is no correlation
between selective waiver and the purposes of the attorney-client privilege or
the work-product protection.  It does nothing to improve the attorney-client177
relationship. If anything, it makes the protections easier to waive, thus failing
to enhance their purposes.  Second, it is unfair to allow a corporation to pick178
and choose its opponents.  Selective waiver would be “just another brush on179
the attorney’s palette,” which could be used as a weapon against
adversaries.  Third, there is no inherent unfairness in refusing to recognize180
selective waiver for a corporation who determined that the benefit of
disclosure outweighed the downside of waiving its protections.  If a party181
makes a tactical decision to waive the privilege in order to obtain some
benefit, it is not unfair to also make that party bear the cost of that decision.182
Fourth, privileges should be narrowly construed because they inhibit fact-
finding.  In order to recognize a privilege, there must be a reason sufficient183
to overcome the impairment on the fact-finder.  Encouraging cooperation184
with law enforcement is not a sufficient reason because the government has
other ways to get the information it needs,  a party has other reasons to185
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cooperate,  and the facts of the cases show that obtaining cooperation is not186
a problem, even without recognition of selective waiver.  Finally, if selective187
waiver is recognized, there seems to be “no logical terminus.”  This results188
in “difficult line drawing” and “uncertainty” in the law.189
Furthermore, selective waiver does nothing to ameliorate the hardship a
corporation suffers when it is compelled to waive its privilege with respect to
the government itself. In fact, the purpose of the Rule is to make corporations
more likely to waive their privileges and protections vis-à-vis the government.
It is clear from the Committee Note to Rule 502 that the purpose of selective
waiver is to increase corporate cooperation in government investigations,
meaning it would make it easier for corporations to waive their attorney-client
privileges and work-product protections when they are being investigated by
the government.190
Routinely compelled waivers of attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection mean that corporations have no protection at all against the
government. Regardless of the protection given a corporation vis-à-vis civil
opponents, the removal of the privilege as to the government is still highly
detrimental to the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection doctrine. If a corporate client knows that its
communications are likely to be left unprotected, it will be less likely to be
candid with its attorney. Encouraging “full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients” is the very purpose of the attorney-client
privilege.  And if an attorney knows that his or her mental impressions and191
other writings are not going to be protected, that attorney is going to be more
hesitant to put things in writing. This will lead to inefficiency and reduced
service to the client, and the legal profession will be demoralized, just as the
United States Supreme Court warned in Hickman.192
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IV. THE SOLUTION: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROTECTION ACT
A. Introduction of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act and Public
Response to the Act
A more comprehensive solution to the erosion of the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product protection was presented in January 2007
when Senator Arlen Specter proposed the “Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act.”  The purpose of this bill is to create a new statute, 18 U.S.C.193
§ 3014, which will protect these important doctrines from infringement by
federal prosecutors.  The proposed statute provides, in relevant part:194
(a) Definitions—In this section:
(1) ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE—The term “attorney-client privilege”
means the attorney-client privilege as governed by the principles of the common law,
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience, and the principles of article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(2) ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT—The term “attorney work product” means
materials prepared by or at the direction of an attorney in anticipation of litigation,
particularly any such materials that contain a mental impression, conclusion, opinion,
or legal theory of that attorney.
(b) In General—In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter,
an agent or attorney of the United States shall not—
(1) demand, request, or condition treatment on the disclosure by an organization,
or person affiliated with that organization, of any communication protected by the
attorney-client privilege or any attorney work product;
(2) condition a civil or criminal charging decision relating to a organization, or
person affiliated with that organization, on, or use as a factor in determining whether
an organization, or person affiliated with that organization, is cooperating with the
Government—
(A) any valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege or privilege for attorney
work product;
. . . .
(3) demand or request that an organization, or person affiliated with that
organization, not take any action described in paragraph (2).
(c) Inapplicability—Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an agent or attorney of the
United States from requesting or seeking any communication or material that such
agent or attorney reasonably believes is not entitled to protection under the attorney-
client privilege or attorney work product doctrine.
(d) Voluntary Disclosures—Nothing in this Act is intended to prohibit an
organization from making, or an agent or attorney of the United States from
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accepting, a voluntary and unsolicited offer to share the internal investigation
materials of such organization.195
This statute forbids the type of compelled waivers the government
currently pursues. In fact, this statute removes all of the government’s
leverage for getting corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege or
work-product protections. No longer will any federal prosecutor be allowed
to ask a corporation to waive its privilege or protection in exchange for
cooperation credit in any form. The corporation cannot be given positive
credit for a waiver, nor can it be given negative credit for refusing to waive its
privileges or protections.
As soon as it was proposed, Senator Specter’s Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act was embraced with relief by the legal community. American
Bar Association President Karen J. Mathis called the Act “critically important
to our nation’s economic and legal health.”  She urged support for the Act196
on the grounds that it “strikes the proper balance between the legitimate needs
of prosecutors and regulators and the constitutional and fundamental legal
rights of individuals and organizations.”  The Coalition to Preserve the197
Attorney-Client Privilege released a statement in December 2007 “to thank
Chairman Specter for sponsoring legislation that would restore the balance
that once existed between the legitimate needs of Justice Department
prosecutors and the legal protections and rights guaranteed under the
American system of justice to employees of companies and other
organizations under investigation.”  Andrew Weissmann, former director of198
the Enron Task Force and partner at Jenner & Block LLP in New York, and
Ana R. Bugan, an associate at Jenner & Block in Chicago, praised Specter,
saying he “has fortunately not been deterred by the [McNulty Memo]” and its
“insufficient” policy changes.  Caroline Fredrickson, director of the ACLU199
Washington Legislative Office, called the Act “a common sense approach to
restoring one of the fundamental legal protections guaranteed under the
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Constitution to those under investigation.”  Edwin Meese III, former United200
States Attorney General and chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at the Heritage Foundation, said that “Senator Specter is to be
commended for his efforts to ensure that the constitutional protections for the
right to counsel are preserved in the investigation or prosecution of business
organizations.”201
B. The ACPPA Would Restore an “Absolute” Attorney-Client Privilege
Which Is Necessary in Order to Restore the Ability of Corporations to Seek
Effective Legal Advice From Their Attorneys
According to Dean Wigmore, a privilege must be absolute in order to be
effective.  “The Supreme Court has not only generally adopted Dean202
Wigmore’s approach to privilege analysis . . . . [It] has specifically endorsed
Wigmore’s insistence on absolute privileges.”  Although the U.S. Attorney’s203
Office has suggested that the privilege may be ignored when the government
needs the information or when it affects the Department of Justice’s ability “to
prosecute in a timely and efficient manner,”  this assertion is directly204
contrary to the well-established assumptions of privilege law. Privileges are
specifically recognized in spite of their limitations on the fact-finding process.
One prominent scholar, Professor Edward Imwinkelried, suggests that the
privilege does not have to be absolute in order to be effective.  However,205
even if this is so, routinely compelled waiver is an effective abrogation of the
privilege. Even if one does not subscribe to Wigmore’s theory that the
privilege must be absolute, one cannot look at the current culture of waiver
and think that any privilege survives. Where corporations know that their
protections and privileges must be waived in order to get credit for
cooperation and to avoid indictment, the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protections are essentially non-existent. Where the attorney-client
2008] CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGES 183
206. Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How
Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 408 (1993).
207. McNulty Memo, supra note 7, at VII.B.
208. Henning, supra note 206, at 408.
privilege and work-product protection are not effective, their underlying
purposes are nullified. Attorney-client relationships are harmed and the
profession itself will suffer.
C. Investigating Corporations: No Easy Task Without Compelled Waiver
Investigating a corporation or a corporate crime is inherently more
difficult than investigating an individual. “By its very nature, the criminal
activity involved is much more complex than street crime, usually consisting
of a number of events spread over an extended period of time, with the ‘real’
evidence frequently buried in reams of business and corporate records relating
to numerous transactions.”  In the words of Deputy Attorney General Paul206
J. McNulty:
In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to
encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself. It will
often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on behalf of the
corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating
divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the
United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct
continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel
may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or retired.
Accordingly, a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits
and locating relevant evidence.207
An officer who is investigating a corporate crime must have access to a
plethora of information just to understand the underpinnings of the
transactions that ultimately culminated in the illegality. “The investigations
require access to documents that detail the conduct of the transactions,
especially the flow of funds and timing of decisions, and the statements of
participants, both innocent and suspect, about the process of events.”208
Even if investigators have access to all of the information within the
corporation, the sheer volume of this information may make it extremely
difficult for an investigator to zero in on the particular transactions that were
involved in the crime. “Often the best witness is the defendant herself . . . in
sorting out the paper trail and explaining the thought processes of the
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defendants in pursuing a series of transactions.”  To the unfamiliar209
investigator, any of the transactions in the series may appear fairly benign. But
the complexity of trying to piece them together may prevent the investigator
from ever understanding what happened without someone providing a road
map.
Investigators of corporate crimes can deal with these obstacles in a variety
of ways. First, they could offer the corporation immunity in exchange for
complete disclosure. This might be a beneficial approach if time is crucial to
a public interest or if there is no other option.  The obvious downside of this210
option is that it entirely forecloses the government’s ability to prosecute the
corporation. This could be particularly inappropriate “where the corporation’s
business is permeated with fraud or other crimes.”  Second, the prosecutor211
could offer immunity to key employees and agents of the corporation in
exchange for their cooperation. Of course, like offering immunity to the entire
corporation, this could result in the most culpable corporate actors being
immune from liability for their participation in the crime since, logically, the
employees who will be in the best position to know what transpired are likely
to be the employees who were most intimately involved in the crime. Third,
the investigator could rely on the cooperation of other individuals within the
organization who do not require immunity. Of the three options, this provides
the best opportunity to get an inside perspective while avoiding giving
immunity to culpable parties. The problem with this option is that these
individuals may be unable to provide adequate assistance to the investigation.
If they were not involved enough to require immunity, then they are unlikely
to be able to provide investigators with any significant guidance regarding the
heart of the illegality.
Thus, simple access to the information may not be enough to provide the
investigators with the tools to understand the crime, and culling additional
help from the parties involved may have significant downsides in the way of
immunity or insufficiency. This means that the temptation to garner other
forms of cooperation is particularly strong in a corporate criminal
investigation. In the end, “the disclosure of privileged information may be
critical in enabling the government to evaluate the accuracy and completeness
of the company’s voluntary disclosure.”  Any legislation prohibiting the use212
of compelled waiver must therefore provide a deterrence factor that will be
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strong enough to overcome the prosecutor’s temptation to obtain “critical”
information in ways that the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act intends
to prevent. The purposes of the Act must be supported by significant remedies
and sanctions or an investigator could be tempted to seek to obtain the
information anyway.
V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE ACPPA213
The ACPPA contains no guidance regarding the appropriate sanctions and
remedies for a violation of the Act. If there is a violation, the courts will be
forced to look to the common law to determine what sanctions and remedies
would be appropriate. The possible sanctions and remedies that might apply
include the following: an evidentiary exclusion of any information illegally
obtained, dismissal of the indictment, or personal sanctions against the
offending attorney. As discussed below, however, these sanctions and
remedies are rarely imposed, may be inapplicable to the pre-indictment stage
where the harm occurs, and may be inadequate to compensate a corporation
for the violation of its rights. Furthermore, the lack of uniformity and certainty
in application of these sanctions and remedies should prevent a corporation
from putting too much faith in the protections of the ACPPA.
A. Exclusion of Information Obtained
The first potential remedy for a violation of the ACPPA is the exclusion
of any information obtained by that violation from use at trial. Logically,
exclusion of the information obtained is appropriate: since the government
would not have had the information but for the waiver, it should not be
allowed to use the illegally obtained information to its own benefit. “In other
areas of criminal law and procedure, exclusion of evidence is often considered
an appropriate remedy where the evidence has been obtained illegally or
through a violation of the defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights.”214
There are two significant problems, however, with expecting the
application of this remedy to violations of the ACPPA. First, exclusion of
evidence is only narrowly applied under the common law.  As a general rule,215
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“a claim of outrageous government conduct premised upon deliberate
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship will be cognizable where the
defendant can point to actual and substantial prejudice.”  This strict standard216
will make it difficult for a corporation to obtain the exclusion of evidence
once waiver has been compelled, illegally or not. Second, it is important to
realize that “the exclusionary rule applies only at the defendant’s criminal trial
and not at ancillary civil proceedings.”  Coupled with the overall rejection217
of the doctrine of selective waiver,  a corporation that has had its rights218
violated under the ACPPA will end up with very little protection for the
information that is disclosed pursuant to an illegally obtained waiver. Neither
the exclusionary rule nor the doctrine of selective waiver will prevent this
information from being used against the corporation in civil matters.
B. Dismissal of the Indictment
Dismissal of the indictment is the remedy that is most likely to prevent an
illegally compelled waiver from harming the corporation. Again, one needs
only to look at the story of Arthur Andersen to see how harmful an indictment
alone can be.  Dismissing an indictment as early in the process as possible219
can minimize the harm to the corporation that might result from an indictment
obtained by use of an illegally compelled waiver. A corporation should not
have to face an indictment based solely on communications that it had with its
attorneys. This is the heart of the attorney-client privilege.
Unfortunately, there are also significant problems with relying on the
courts to apply this remedy in the absence of a provision in the ACPPA itself.
For instance:
Under the common law, dismissal of an indictment is only permissible in limited
circumstances. Essentially, it will only be dismissed if the prosecutor has violated
certain of the defendant’s constitutional rights, such as the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the right under the double-jeopardy clause not to be tried
for the same crime or the right under the equal-protection clause not to be selectively
prosecuted.220
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Additionally, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that “dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only ‘if
it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s
decision to indict,’ or if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the decision to indict was
free from the substantial influence of such violations.”  Like the standard for221
exclusion of the evidence, supra, this is a very difficult standard to satisfy.222
C. Personal Sanctions
In many cases, courts are also free to apply personal sanctions against an
individual who violates a federal law. If an individual government official
chooses to violate the ACPPA, that individual could be held personally liable
for that decision. In a complicated and high profile corporate investigation, the
temptation for an individual to cut corners in order to get the necessary
information is significant. Therefore, it seems appropriate to have some
mechanism to provide a personal deterrent against such behavior. Personal
liability for the action seems to be an essential part of preventing an individual
from succumbing to the temptation to obtain the much-needed information
through violation of the ACPPA.
Since there are no specific sanctions provided by the ACPPA, and since
the courts cannot invoke their contempt powers to order discretionary
sanctions to matters that are not before the court, the only way that a
government official will face personal sanctions is by way of a civil action
against the government actor. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,  private individuals223
are able to bring a civil suit against a government actor if that actor violated
any of the individual’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws,” while acting “under color of any statute . . . of any
State or territory or the District of Columbia.”224
However, § 1983 actions are limited to claims against state government
actors.  Although the United States Supreme Court has created a similar225
claim for actions against federal government actors acting under federal law,
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this cause of action has thus far only been allowed where the violation was a
constitutional violation.226
In addition to the inapplicability of § 1983 and the limited reach of a
Bivens action, a corporation seeking to recover damages from a federal
prosecutor would also have to overcome the protections of the qualified
immunity doctrine. “In varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to
officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based.”  This qualified immunity is the same as that227
provided to officials under § 1983,  which extends immunity unless there228
was “some showing of malice” or “unless the constitutional right he was
alleged to have violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
violation.”229
CONCLUSION
Compelled waiver is a very real threat to the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product protection doctrine. The evidence shows that the
government systematically pursues waiver of these protections when it is
investigating a corporation. Furthermore, recent testimony and official
memoranda show that the Department of Justice has no interest in departing
from this course of action: the Holder Memo, Mr. McCallum’s remarks to the
Sentencing Commission, and the McNulty Memo’s recent minimal
improvement to the Department of Justice policy demonstrate that the
government is not going to self-regulate.
Although the doctrine of selective waiver has the potential to protect
corporations from one adverse consequence of compelled waiver, it has been
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systematically rejected by nearly every court that has considered it, and it
seems unlikely to be revived in the future. Even if selective waiver is revived,
however, it does not go nearly far enough to protect corporations from the
primary concern of compelled waiver. It gives corporations no protection from
the primary harms that result when a corporation has no attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection vis-à-vis the government. If anything, it
encourages these waivers and further abrogates these protections versus the
government.
The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act has the potential to be a
powerful tool for preserving the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection, but corporations should still be aware of the temptation that
prosecutors and investigators will have to obtain their confidential information
in spite of the Act. A corporation should not rely on potential remedies and
sanctions under the Act because it is unclear that any remedies or sanctions
will actually be available in the event that a violation does arise. Instead,
corporations should be on guard against potential pressures to waive their
attorney-client privilege and work-product protections and should seek to
actively protect these privileges rather than rely on the Act to do it for them.
